6 thoughts on “Two Types of Social Properties: A defense of Ontological Individualism”

1. Vuille, Antoine says:

   5 years ago at 18 h 22 min

   Hi Antoine, very interesting talk, well done ! I am not sure to understand the meaning of “the social statut of being a jewel’s guardian”. Is it (1) a job (one is a jewel’s guardian like one is a policeman or a PhD student) ; (2) a (social?) activity currently performed by someone : one is currently guarding the jewel which is in the safe ; (3) Something else ?
   If the answer is (1), then the status is not lost in the counterfactual situation 1, neither in the counterfactual situation 2 (the guardian has not lost his job in these counterfactual situations).
   If the answer is (2), then the status is lost in the counterfactual situation 1 (as there is no longer any jewel) (but in that case, what else is lost in the counterfactual situation 2 ? Probably not the status … ? )
   See you at your Q&A session!
   Antoine2

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   1. Antoine Taillard says:

      5 years ago at 8 h 44 min

      Hi Antoine,

      Thank you for your question! I now realize that my example was a bit under-described. I probably should have started from an actual situation instead.

      I definitely understand “being a jewel guardian” as a job/social role, not merely as an activity. So (1).

      However, I am not sure why you say that no such social property is lost in the counterfactual situation 2. Surely, you can ‘fill in the blanks’ in my example such that the closest possible world where the jewel is destroyed and the destruction is noticed is one where the guardian loses their job. Just think of an actual situation where someone made a big mistake at their job, a mistake so big that it got them fired when it was discovered.

      (Regarding counterfactual situation 1: if no social property (W- or R-) is lost in that case, then you simply don’t have an argument against Ontological Individualism in the first place.)

2. Schmitz, Michael says:

   5 years ago at 16 h 21 min

   Hi Antoine, thank you, nice talk! I was wondering how you think the issue you were considering is related to general externalism about content / meaning and also such debates as intentionalism vs. relationism about perception. It seems to me that imagining your possession or what you guard being destroyed without you noticing is rather like imagining your perceptual object or an object of thought disappearing without you noticing. And then one group of people will insist that the representational state is essential, while others will deny it. Or they might deny that there is even a relevant representational state, as some people do in the perception debate. I think that may also be part of what motivates Brian’s rejection of individualism. If I remember correctly, he doubts that something being a social object can be sufficiently explained in terms of subjects’ intentional states. I’m on your side in this, but how would you respond to such an argument, and again, do you agree that these debates run in parallel?

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   1. Antoine Taillard says:

      5 years ago at 8 h 25 min

      Hi Michael,

      Thank you for watching my video. This is a great question and I am afraid I don’t have a great answer to it. But let me try anyway.

      I was hoping to avoid the whole debate externalism/internalism about mental content. I assumed a property such as “being an ancient jewel” (or “being an aggregate of carbon atoms” or …) to be mind-independent. (In other words: I am speaking of “being an ancient jewel, tout court” not of “being an ancient jewel qua …”.) Thus, I am not sure why I ought to say my possession being destroyed without me noticing is like my object of thought disappearing without me noticing.

3. Zachos, Dimitrios says:

   5 years ago at 18 h 39 min

   Thank you for the interesting talk, Antoine!
   Just a question: I understand why and what you are trying to prove with your proposed counterexample, but I’m not so clear on whether the example is an appropriate one. In what sense aren’t “being a jewel” and “being ancient” social properties? I understand “jewel” as “valuable stone” and “ancient” as “very old”, but these things involve gradations and imply certain valuations that seem to be obviously ‘socially-premised’, much like a a ‘ dollar bill’ (there are certain normative parameters involved and a certain social consensus, etc…). But perhaps I’m interpreting things wrong….Just a thought!
   Thanks again for the talk!

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   1. Antoine Taillard says:

      5 years ago at 17 h 32 min

      Hi Dimitrios,

      Thank you for your question. That is a very good point! I probably should have been more careful with my example.

      Fortunately (for me), I think the problem is not too serious for my account. The example would run similarly had I instead picked “being an aggregate of carbon atoms” or “being 4.367 light years from Alpha Centauri” or [insert your favorite example of non-social/non-individualistic property here]. For example, in Epstein 2009, p. 202, the relevant property is “being a hanging chad”.

      Thanks again! Hope to see you at one of the Q&A.